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Abstract 
In the United States, health care technology has contributed to rising survival rates, yet health care 
spending relative to GDP has also grown more rapidly than in any other country.  We develop a 
model of patient demand and supplier behavior to explain these parallel trends in technology growth 
and cost growth.  We show that health care productivity depends on the heterogeneity of treatment 
effects across patients, the shape of the health production function, and the cost structure of 
procedures such as MRIs with high fixed costs and low marginal costs. The model implies a typology 
of medical technology productivity: (I) highly cost-effective “home run” innovations with little 
chance of overuse, such as anti-retroviral therapy for HIV, (II) treatments highly effective for some 
but not for all (e.g. stents), and (III) “gray area” treatments with uncertain clinical value such as ICU 
days among chronically ill patients.  Not surprisingly, countries adopting Category I and effective 
Category II treatments gain the greatest health improvements, while countries adopting ineffective 
Category II and Category III treatments experience the most rapid cost growth. Ultimately, economic 
and political resistance in the U.S. to ever-rising tax rates will slow cost growth, with uncertain 
effects on technology growth.  
  
                                                 
*  This research was funded by the National Institute of Aging NIA P01 AG19783 and the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation. We thank without implicating David Balan, Michael Chernew, Janet Currie, David Cutler, Alan Garber, 
Dana Goldman, Elliott Fisher, Victor Fuchs, Roger Gordon, Daniel Lawver, Ellen Meara, Joseph Newhouse, Gabriel 
Scheffler, Mark Schlesinger, Zirui Song, Douglas Staiger, Jack Wennberg, seminar participants at the University of 
Washington, Dartmouth,  RAND, University of California Berkeley, Harvard University, MIT, NBER, Yale, and two 
anonymous referees for insightful comments.  The opinions in this paper are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the NIA or the NBER. 
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1. Introduction  
 The science section of a U.S. newspaper routinely features articles on new surgical and 
pharmaceutical treatments for cancer, obesity, aging, and cardiovascular diseases, with rosy 
predictions of expanded longevity and improved health functioning (Wade, 2009). The business 
section, on the other hand, features gloomy reports of galloping health insurance premiums 
(Claxton et al., 2010), declining insurance coverage, and unsustainable Medicare and Medicaid 
growth leading to higher taxes (Leonhardt, 2009) and downgraded U.S. debt (Stein, 2006). Not 
surprisingly, there is some ambiguity as to whether these two trends, in outcomes and in 
expenditures, are a cause for celebration or concern.   
 Economists and other observers often point to technology growth as the source of both 
trends. Newhouse (1992) considered a wide variety of factors that could reasonably have caused 
the rapid growth in health care expenditures, such as an aging population or the expansion of 
health insurance, and concluded that only technology growth could explain the vast majority of 
expenditure growth.  Similarly, Cutler (2004) has argued that technological advances have 
generated both the far-reaching advances in longevity and the rapid growth in costs.1
 As a first step, we develop a demand-side model of health care, and like Hall and Jones 
(2007), show that rising income levels can optimally generate rapid growth in health care costs in 
a model with well functioning private insurance markets.  But we also show that a rising role of 
government financing in health care can attenuate optimal growth as marginal tax rates rise 
(Baicker and Skinner, 2011).  We then complete the supply-side with a parsimonious model of 
physician behavior, anchored by the assumption that physicians want to do everything in their 
power to cure their patient, given financial, ethical, and resource constraints.  
 
Unfortunately, simply attaching the label of “technological growth” as the major cause of 
increases in health care expenditures doesn’t get us much closer to understanding either the 
pathology of the disease  – if it is a disease – or a meaningful way to address the problem – if it 
is a problem.  Thus the principal focus of the paper is to better understand technological growth 
in health care and its impact on cost-growth and productivity improvements. 
 The model is then used to distinguish among three general categories of treatments, ranked in 
                                                 
1 Cutler (2004) writes, “Money matters in health care as it does in few other industries. Where we have spent a lot, 
we have received a lot in return.”  
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order of their contribution to health care productivity, defined as the improvement in health 
outcomes per dollar increase in costs.  (These three categories closely parallel the Wennberg, 
Fisher, and Skinner (2002) categorizations of effective, preference sensitive, and supply-
sensitive care.)  We find that the greatest health contribution occurs for low cost but highly 
effective treatments: antibiotics for bacterial infection, a cast for a simple fracture, or aspirin and 
beta-blockers for heart attack patients.  Highly productive innovations may be expensive – for 
example, anti-retroviral drugs for the treatment of people with HIV/AIDS.  But the key to the 
high average productivity of these expensive drugs is a strongly negative second derivative of the 
survival (or production) function, so that benefits quickly turn negative for non-HIV-infected 
patients.  Thus, few patients are treated in a cost-ineffective way, whether because of serious 
adverse effects (as in the case of anti-retrovirals) or because the treatments are so inexpensive (in 
the case of aspirin for heart attacks).   
 A second broad category of medical technologies includes treatments and procedures whose 
benefits are substantial for at least some patients, but where the second derivative of the survival 
function is small in magnitude, meaning there is a large population of potential patients for 
whom health benefits converge towards zero as costs accumulate. Angioplasties with stents are a 
good example.  In this procedure, a catheter is used to free blockages in the heart, and the stent, a 
wire mesh, is inserted to maintain blood flow.  For heart attack patients treated within the first 12 
hours following the heart attack, the benefits of stents are substantial.  But there are many more 
patients where the value of angioplasty is less clear, for example among those with stable angina, 
or among those with little taste for the inherent risk of surgery. Because there are more people in 
the latter category than in the former and the U.S. health care system compensates generously for 
all procedures, the marginal health benefits of this innovation are driven to zero and average 
productivity is diminished substantially.   
 The third treatment category of technological innovations encompasses those treatments for 
which benefits are small or there is little scientific evidence of their value.  This wide category 
includes treatments for which randomized trials indicate no benefit (vertebroplasty, in which 
cement is injected to stabilize vertebrae), as well as procedures whose effectiveness has not been 
evaluated (intensity-modulated radiation therapy for prostate cancer).  There are also many 
decisions made in the management of chronic illness that correspond to this category.  Few 
randomized trials have been conducted to evaluate when pneumonia patients should be admitted 
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to the hospital, how frequently patients with chronic disease need to see a physician, or whether 
specialists or primary care physicians can best coordinate and provide high-quality care.  Not 
surprisingly, much of the improved health is generated by our first category of treatments, while 
much of the cost growth is generated by the third.   
 To return to our original question, we suggest that it’s not technology per se that causes 
growth in health care expenditures – it’s the patients with full insurance coverage who demand 
the latest prosthetic hip.  It’s the urologist who installs the latest 64-slice CT scanner in his 
office. Thus U.S. health care spending as a percentage of GDP has risen rapidly compared to 
other countries because the reimbursement system encourages the widespread diffusion of both 
old and new technology.  This is particularly true of the U.S. Medicare program that offers 
generous incentives for more intensive care. In some cases, this means that the U.S. can be the 
first to enjoy the benefits of as-yet unproven technology. The downside is the widespread use of 
treatments with unproven value, and the scarcity of cost-saving innovations (Nelson et al., 2009).   
 What are the implications for the future?  In a classic 1991 article, Weisbrod suggested that 
the then-new Medicare prospective payment system would provide incentives to develop cost-
saving technologies. His prediction may have been premature, but there is increasing evidence of 
the potential for cost-saving technologies (with equivalent or better outcomes) in the 
management and organization of health care to yield substantial productivity gains. But these 
types of innovations are unlikely to diffuse widely through the U.S. health care system until there 
are much stronger incentives to do so. Whether U.S. health care reform can change these 
incentives remains to be seen.  But ultimately, the growth in health care spending will be limited 
by the shrinking ability of private insurance markets and tax revenues to finance ever-rising 
health care bills. 
 
2.  Empirical Patterns of Health Care Costs and Outcomes 
 It is well understood that the United States is an outlier with respect to health care spending, 
whether on a per-capita dollar basis, or with respect to the share of GDP devoted to health care, 
which in 2009 was 17.6 percent.  But is the U.S. also an outlier with respect to growth in health 
care spending?    
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 This question is considered in more detail using a comprehensive sample of 21 developed 
countries (Table 1) and a smaller sample of 6 countries (Figure 1).2  Countries are ranked 
according to their initial 1980 share of GDP devoted to health care, and further categorized into 
low, medium, and high shares of health care spending relative to GDP.  In 1980, the U.S. was the 
highest among this sample (9.0 percent of GDP), but not much higher than in Sweden and 
Denmark (8.9 percent), West Germany (8.4 percent), or Ireland (8.2 percent).  The U.S. is not an 
outlier with respect to real per-capital growth rates in health care spending: its annual growth rate 
from 1980 to 2008 (4.0 percent) is lower than in Spain, Portugal, Norway, and Ireland, and 
barely higher than in the U.K. (3.8 percent).3
But the U.S. is an outlier with respect to growth in the share of GDP devoted to health care: a 
growth of 7 percentage points (from 9 to 16 percent of GDP) between 1980 and 2008, well above 
the average of the other OECD countries (2.7 percentage points) and the next-highest country, 
Portugal (4.6 percentage points).  As Figure 1 also shows, the U.S. particularly stands out among 
the countries with initially high 1980 health spending: Average growth in the share of GDP 
devoted to health care in Sweden, Denmark, and Germany (excluding the U.S.) is less than one 
percentage point.  Price differences may explain a portion of inter-country spending differences 
at a point in time (Anderson, et al., 2003), but we do not think that U.S. price growth explains the 
more rapid increase in the U.S. share of health spending.  
  Nor is it an outlier with respect to annual real GDP 
growth: its 1.8 percent annual rate was roughly average among the sample of 21 countries. 
  It is useful to at least check that U.S. survival rates didn’t grow faster than the countries with 
the slower-growing health care sectors. Garber and Skinner (2008) found that, over time, U.S. 
life expectancy growth has lagged behind a sample of 5 benchmark European countries.  And 
while Preston and Ho (2009) have suggested that different trends in health behavior can explain 
these lagging U.S. mortality rates,  Muennig and Glied (2010) finds U.S. survival trends lagging 
even after adjusting for smoking behavior and obesity trends.   
                                                 
2  All data from OECD (2010).  These countries were chosen if data existed for 1980-2008 (a few countries were 
missing 2008 data so we used 2007 or 2006 data instead.  Korea and Turkey were excluded because their initial 
share of GDP devoted to health care (3.9 and 2.4 percent respectively) were so low. We are comparing unified 
Germany in 2008 with West Germany in 1980, but constructing two series (1980-90 for West Germany and 1992-
2008 for unified Germany) and adding their growth, implies a smaller percentage point increase in health care 
spending; just 0.8 rather than 2.5 percentage points.    
3 White (2007) however has argued that even U.S. growth rates were excessive relative to other OECD countries. 
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 Variation in Medicare growth rates can also be seen within the United States. Figure 2 
reports the growth of per-capita Medicare spending for specific Hospital Referral Regions. 
During 1992-2006, inflation-adjusted per-capita Medicare spending rose at an average annual 
rate of 3.5 percent. But this rapid growth still masked variations in levels of spending and in 
growth rates across regions; San Francisco grew slower than the US at 2.4 percent, while Miami, 
already starting from a high level of spending, experienced above-average 5.0 percent annual 
growth.  McAllen, Texas, the subject of an influential New Yorker article (Gawande, 2009) 
experienced the most rapid recent growth – 8.3 percent annually – of all regions.  Confronted 
with these differences in growth rates and growth rates across regions (Chernew, et al., 2009), it 
is natural to ask: Why did health care spending in some regions or countries grow faster than 
others? And how did these differing growth rates affect health outcomes?  Our paper offers a 
framework to analyze both questions.  
 
3. A Simple Model of Health Care and Growth  
 The traditional introduction to the economics of health care begins with the question of why 
is health care so different from other goods. A reasonable place to begin is what appears to be a 
fundamental human concern with the pain and suffering of others, which in turn has been 
reflected in a collectivist view of health care.  As health care became more expensive, insurance 
markets appeared  to insure patients against growing financial risk, ensure that providers got 
paid, and in the case of publicly-provided insurance, to garner political dividends arising from 
the creation of a broad-based entitlement program (Fuchs, 1998).   Widespread insurance 
markets lead naturally to the twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Cutler and 
Zeckhauser, 2004).  Moral hazard occurs because a third-party, the insurance company, is paying 
most of the cost of the transaction between the first party (the physician or health provider) and 
the second party (the patient).  This can lead to individuals not taking sufficient precaution 
against illness, or more commonly, it can cause patients and providers to consume and provide 
“too much” health care (Newhouse, 1993). 
 Adverse selection can occur on both sides of the market.  Insurance companies structure 
contracts in a way to attract low-risk enrollees away from other firms, for example by offering 
managed care options that are most appealing to healthy enrollees.  Adverse selection can also 
p.7 
occur on the consumer side of the market, for example when people with higher expectations of 
poor health buy long-term care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). 
 A third issue that arises in health care is the principal-agent problem; that because of 
asymmetric information, the physician is making decisions on behalf of the patient, leading to 
decisions that accommodate physician interests.  This is the basis for a long-standing debate over 
the existence of “supplier-induced demand,” a literature extending back several decades that 
seeks to find evidence of physicians acting in their interest – to shift out demand for their 
services – even when it may harm, at least financially, the patient (McGuire, 2000). 
 While each of these three issues is clearly important for health care policy, they are not 
equally important in explaining the twin growth rates in technological progress and health care 
costs.   We are less concerned with the adverse-selection problem, since rapid growth in 
spending occurs even in settings where adverse selection issues are less important, such as 
Medicare (covering nearly every elderly American) and other countries with national health 
insurance. Rather, we argue that the combination of moral hazard and the principal agent 
problem has provided fertile ground for the particularly rapid growth in health care costs.   
 In our analysis we are not thinking as much of the traditional (static) moral hazard problem, 
since typical estimates of price elasticity cannot explain more than a tiny fraction of the overall 
growth in health care costs (Newhouse, 1992; Manning et al., 1987). The more important role of 
insurance is in financing the dramatic growth in health care expenditures through innovation and 
the rapid diffusion of technology (Finkelstein, 2007). This view has its antecedents in 
Weisbrod’s (1991) classic article arguing that the structure of insurance coverage was an integral 
part of rapid cost growth.  The intuition is straightforward: if you pay for it, they will build it. 
This paper seeks to retain the spirit of Weisbrod’s insights as we next develop a simple model of 
demand (consumer) and supply (provider) decisions to characterize the process of growth in 
technology and expenditures.  
3.1 The Demand for Health Care  
 We develop intuition from the demand-side models in Hall and Jones (2007) and Murphy 
and Topel (2006) by collapsing the structure to a 2-period model of consumption and leisure, 
where a consumer’s utility is based on consumption and leisure in the first period, and post-
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retirement consumption in the second period.4
(1)       
 
 
  The probability of surviving to the second period, 
s(x), is in turn is influenced by medical spending x: 
where Ci is consumption in period i, ℓ1 is leisure in period 1 (and retiree leisure is subsumed in 
the second-period utility function U~ ),  δ is the discount rate, x measures health care inputs, and 
the survival function is concave, so that s’(x) ≥ 0, s” < 0.5
 Utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint:  
   More generally, s may be viewed as 
a “quality of life” indicator that reflects both survival and functioning since it augments second-
period consumption and leisure.  Measuring quality of life, and not simply survival, is important 
in assessing the productivity of new innovations.  Hip replacements, knee replacements, and 
back surgery for spinal stenosis are all procedures that improve the quality and not the quantity 
of life.  
(2)      )1/()1( 2111 rCpxCPw +++=−−    
where w1 is the wage rate, p the consumer price of health care, P the premium paid for insurance 
when p differs from q, the social cost of health care, and r is the interest rate.6
(3)         
  The maximization 
problem yields the optimality condition for the individual (holding P constant) 
This captures the idea that optimal spending on health should be at the point where p dollars 
given up for period one consumption should yield equal incremental benefits from an improved 
chance of surviving to period two.  Rearranging (3) yields  
                                                 
4   In a more complicated n-period model, technological innovation in health care provides benefits throughout the 
life cycle (Baicker and Skinner, 2011). 
5   When the s(x) function is non-concave, the presence of health insurance can also have a first-order impact on 
utility (Nyman, 1999).  This occurs in the case where insurance allows low income individuals to receive, say, a 
$100,000 bone marrow transplant for which there is no reasonable alternative that is slightly less effective but lower 
cost. 
6  For more complex models involving investments in health capital, see Grossman (1972). 
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(4)          
 We define Ψ to be individual demand for an extra quality-adjusted year of survival, which in 
turn depends on the ratio of total second-period utility divided by the marginal utility of period-
one consumption.  In other words, because health is viewed as extending the period of time that 
one enjoys in this world, the benefit relates to total utility of retirement leisure and consumption 
(Murphy and Topel, 2006).  Thus the value of remaining life years could therefore remain 
substantial even after the individual has retired and is supported by Social Security and pension 
income. 7
 Assume that the price of health care p is equal to its social cost q, and we can normalize 
health care inputs x such that the social cost q = 1.  Then the right-hand side of Equation (4) is 
simply the cost-effectiveness ratio, or how much it costs at the margin to gain one quality-
adjusted life year, which is optimally set equal to marginal demand, Ψ.   
   
 A key implication of this model is that a rise in income and consumption will imply a more-
than-proportional decline in the marginal utility of non-medical consumption. For example, if we 
assume a constant relative risk aversion γ of 2 for utility, then doubling income would reduce the 
marginal utility of consumption to 2-2 = .25 times its previous level. Combined with the small 
increase in second-period utility, willingness to pay for health care will rise more than four 
times, thus stimulating demand for additional health care – or moving society along the s(x) 
curve to a point where the optimal cost-effectiveness ratio is considerably larger than it is now.  
Intuitively, the marginal utility of a third car or flat screen TV in a future affluent world should 
be much lower than an increased opportunity to enjoy that extra utility in the future (Hall and 
Jones, 2007).  Thus Hall and Jones suggest that we might (optimally) devote as much as one-
third of future GDP to health care.  
 A limitation of this utility-based approach arises because we cannot measure directly year-
specific utility.  The typical approach to writing utility in these models is to include a constant 
                                                 
7  For the social planner, there is an additional term, which captures whether an individual is making a net 
contribution to society in the sense of their income being greater than consumption (Murphy and Topel, 2006; Hall 
and Jones, 2007). 
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term, so that  where γ is, as above, the Arrow-Pratt constant relative risk aversion.  
The reason why we need an intercept term b is because otherwise, when γ > 1, utility is less than 
zero (C1-γ/(1-γ) < 0), implying that early death would improve lifetime utility.  Thus b is a free 
variable, and in practice it is calibrated to match existing evidence on how much to value a 
human life.   Murphy and Topel (2006) suggest that a life-year may be worth as much as 
$350,000 depending on age based on an EPA midpoint of $6.2 million for a human life.  But 
there is considerable debate about the “value” of a life, with confidence intervals from earlier 
studies ranging from one to ten million dollars (Dockins, et al., 2004; also see Aldy and Viscusi, 
2008).  Ashenfelter and Greenstone’s (2004) estimate of 1.9 million dollars  (in 2006 dollars) is 
at the lower end of the estimates, but yields a value per life-year of about $100,000 for middle-
aged people, consistent with the Garber and Phelps (1997) rule-of-thumb that a life-year should 
be valued at roughly double average annual income.   
 One might also object to the model’s assumption that the expected value of second-period 
utility is )(~)( 2CUxs rather than a more general functional form )),(( 2CxsU  allowing for 
diminishing returns to greater longevity.  While the former specification matches the time-series 
evidence in the U.S., it does less well in matching cross-sectional data.  When γ = 2, for example, 
an individual with $200,000 in income should be willing to pay 100 times as much at the margin 
for health care as an otherwise identical person with $20,000 in income.  Even allowing for the 
presence of health insurance (which would blunt such income differences), we do not observe 
such a pronounced difference in health care expenditures (McClellan and Skinner, 2006).  
 One could reconcile this paradox in a model where fundamental choices about health care 
technology are made collectively.  Society chooses a single basic level of technology for 
everyone, either because of ethical and equity concerns, because the care is provided under a 
uniform insurance program (e.g., Medicare), or because it makes little sense to maintain 
hospitals and emergency rooms catering solely to high-income patients.  In this case, the optimal 
level of care is determined by treating health care as if it were a public good, where optimal 
health care is determined by equating the sum of marginal rates of substitution between health 
care and other goods across the entire population equal to aggregate costs.  This approach, which 
implies a single aggregate “value of life,” would exhibit rising health care costs over time but 
γ
γ
−
+=
−
1
~ 12CbU
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much less variation across income groups at a point in time.  
 Another concern with the above framework is the assumption that health care (or health care 
insurance) is purchased in a representative agent model. In practice, health care financing 
involves both the government sector and considerable amounts of redistribution, from young to 
old and from healthy to sick.  Consider the extreme case of a health care system financed entirely 
by a payroll tax with no copayments: 
(2’)         
where τ is the marginal tax rate.  Ignoring other government expenditures, the budget constraint 
for the government (in per capita terms) is τwqx )1( 1−= .  The first-order condition in 
Equation (4) is rewritten: 
(5)       
where ]/)1/[()]1[( 111 ττ dd −−−=Ω .   Note that Ω is greater than one whenever taxation 
induces efficiency costs.  Furthermore, as the marginal tax rate rises, Ω will rise more than 
proportionally, leading to a much-diminished demand for additional health care.8
 Despite these caveats, the implications of the model are twofold: that relative demand for 
health care may be expected to increase over time, and that “optimal” growth depends on how 
health care is financed.  We next turn to the supply side of the health care market. 
  Thus over 
time, financing constraints could act as an additional brake on health care demand (Baicker and 
Skinner, 2011).   
 
3.2 A Static Model of Provider Behavior 
 We develop a model of physician and provider behavior based in a standard economic 
framework, but one which tries to capture what physicians say and do.  The model is grounded in 
                                                 
8   As Kaplow (2008) has argued, the diminished demand for health care arises not so much from the distortion of 
the tax per se, which in theory can be undone by appropriate transfers, but because of the increased requirement to 
redistribute resources across individuals.  
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a single assumption about behavior:  
Health care providers seek to maximize the perceived health of their patient, but 
may deviate from this goal because of financial incentives, resource capacity, 
ethical judgment, and patient demand.    
That is, the vast majority of physicians and health care providers do their best to improve 
as many lives as they can.9  While there are always occasional rogue physicians who game the 
system at the expense of patients, 10 most physicians believe that what they are doing is best for 
their patient, and when unconstrained, say they’ve done everything possible.11 While there is 
remarkable heterogeneity in physician beliefs, as we document below, let us for the moment 
assume that there is a single known survival or “production” function ( ) for patient i at time t, 
and that physicians seek to maximize the value of  health Ψ (
In practice, there are both explicit and implicit (or hidden) constraints on health care.  In 
the U.S. explicit restrictions are rare, and they are generally restricted to gatekeeper models of 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which may require a second opinion or a sign-off for 
common medical procedures.  Implicit restrictions are more common; the limitations of 
) by driving the marginal value of 
spending to zero.  
                                                 
9  This model is simpler in many respects than the model in Pauly (1980), where physicians provide two kinds of 
services (diagnostic and therapeutic), and they may adjust both prices and quality of care (e.g., accuracy of 
diagnosis) depending on market demand and the extent of competition in the market.   
10 For example, two cardiac surgeons in Redding, CA, motivated by artificially high payment rates, pulled healthy 
patients off the golf course for emergency cardiac surgery (Enkoji, 2002).   
11   This is illustrated in the following quotation from an ICU physician (Goertz, 2004): 
Here is an example I have used when teaching medical students and residents: You are taking care of 
a patient in the ICU. You have done every test and procedure you know to do and have done 
everything that all the consultants have recommended. I now tell you that you must spend another 
$5,000 (originally I used $1,000) to improve the patient's quality of care. What would you do with the 
money? 
By this point the student or resident is in a bit of a quandary because they are not quite sure how to 
use the additional money. If there were a continuing positive linear relationship, it should be 
reasonably easy to suggest more things that result in improved patient care. Generally the suggestions 
are more, or repeated, tests and procedures. I respond to the common answers with a statement that if 
you do more tests or procedures, you could in fact make the patient worse. How? If you do more tests, 
all tests have false positives and negatives. How will you use results that contradict earlier tests? With 
again more tests, and the subsequent potential for much more confusion. If you repeat or do another 
procedure, how do you interpret the results? Also, procedures generally have potential side effects or 
complications, so again you have a very high risk of NOT improving quality or outcome with more 
money.  
p.13 
physicians who only have 24 hours in the day, a lack of diagnostic or surgical facilities (or 
catheterization labs not staffed at night), and queues for the MRI or intensive care unit (ICU) 
beds.  Physicians often do not chafe against these implicit restrictions or are even aware of them, 
simply adjusting their “best practice” to the resources they are accustomed to using.   
 Physicians also care about the income they make. Let income for physician j be defined as  
(6)        jtjtjttjtjt RxWmY −+= π  
where income comprises two parts: the salary component, equal to Wjt  (payment per patient) 
times the number of patients mjt; and the business component; the number of total procedures per 
physician summed over their I(j) patients, xjt = Σi=I(j) xijt times marginal profitability πjt minus 
fixed costs Rjt  Note that the price paid by the patient, p, could be quite different from the 
profitability of the procedure, π.12
 We posit that income Y enters positively in the utility function, but allow as well for a target 
or reference income Zjt (see Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2003), so the income-based component of 
utility is 
   
)( jtjt ZY −Ω=Ω .
13
 One factor that could affect growth differentially is the fraction of physician income derived 
from salary versus business sources.  For example, many health care providers in the U.S. own or 
lease expensive machinery such as MRIs, 64-slice computerized tomography, and robotic 
surgical machinery.  These tend to exhibit high fixed costs R and (at least in the U.S.) high 
marginal profit (π) per unit of use, up to their capacity limit; thus both income and substitution 
effects would encourage expanded use.  Thus, the structure of how new technologies are 
reimbursed affects the speed and extent of their diffusion across countries.  
   Thus the health care provider is assumed to maximize the sum 
Ψtst(xit) + Ω.  
 Capacity constraints are more likely in countries such as the U.K. or other countries with 
centralized financing.  In this case, the central health agency has a global budget used to provide 
inputs to individual hospitals and clinics, for example a certain number of artificial knee or hip 
                                                 
12 While we maintain a single composite x for inputs, in practice different types of inputs exhibit much different 
levels of profitability, for example cardiac procedures are typically very well compensated (Hayes et al., 2007), 
while others are loss leaders.   
13  Target income behavior would be generated by specifying that Ω’ is large and positive for Yjt – Zjt < 0, and zero 
otherwise. 
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joints devices (Aaron and Schwartz, 2005).  Similarly, some regions may not be allocated as 
many magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machines, or cardiac catheterization units.  Typically, 
physicians adjust implicitly to these constraints, although waiting lists for surgery are often the 
subject of public demonstrations and political controversy.  Alternatively, the constraint could 
reflect ethical norms against spending too much of the nation’s resources.  Whether implicit or 
explicit, physicians and hospitals in these cases are operating subject to constraints, which can be 
expressed as .  
 An implication of the supplier-induced demand model is that physicians will knowingly harm 
their patients if they are paid enough to do so.  This model, however, assumes that every 
physician believes their actions will benefit the patient.  We therefore include an additional 
constraint that the patients treated by physician j must be better off than the utility level in the 
absence of the treatment, .14
 At a point in time, the Lagrangian for a given physician is written:    
  This is admittedly a simplistic way to consider the demand side, 
but it is consistent with empirical evidence (Jacobson, et al., 2010).   
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 The first-order condition for (7) is: 
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where ωjt is the derivative of Ω, and vjt the total derivative of V with respect to x (including any 
decline in non-medical consumption as a consequence of purchasing x), evaluated for the jth 
physician at time t. That is, physicians spend up to the point where the combination of the social 
marginal value of health or functioning, and the financial reward or penalty, weighted by the 
importance of such rewards (ω), is limited by a capacity (or knowledge) constraint μ and a 
demand-side constraint that insures the individual is better off with the treatment than without.  It 
is convenient to define a variable λ that summarizes the overall impact of financial incentives, 
capacity constraints, and demand:  
jtjtjtjtjt vΦ−+−≡ µπωλ  
                                                 
14  Note that the constraint that patients are better off does not preclude putting the patient at some risk – for 
example, plastic surgery carries risks, but the patient prefers the treatment.  For the sake of simplicity, we assume a 
representative patient rather than multiple patients each with a binding constraint.     
jtjt Xx ≤
jtV
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 How then is supply and demand equated? Note that demand in Equation (4) can be rewritten 
as Ψtst’(x) = pt (or the price facing the consumer) while the physician sets Ψtst’(x) = λt.  Different 
scenarios are illustrated in Figure 3, where the model assumes that physicians are able to allocate 
treatments to those who would benefit most. In the framework of labor economics, this is the 
assumption that physicians use a Roy Model to rank patients on the basis of their benefit from a 
benefit and then work down that distribution, so the marginal patient is the one with the lowest 
incremental benefit.  This assumption is supported by empirical work for heart attacks (Chandra 
and Staiger, 2007) and for Cesarean sections (Baicker, Buckles and Chandra, 2006).   
 First consider a hypothetical country arbitrarily labeled “UK” where supply constraints are 
sufficiently high to exceed both out-of-pocket costs for most treatments, so that (p < λ), but are 
also high enough so that λ exceeds the social cost q. In this case, there is too little spending on 
health care.  (One might expect private markets to spring up in this case, where wealthy patients 
demand additional services even at q.)   Next, consider the case where individuals face the full 
price of their health care q, perhaps because they lack insurance or are paying from a health 
savings account.15
 Finally, we consider the more common case in the U.S. where low out-of-pocket expenses 
faced by consumers coupled with profitable compensation for procedures results in λ < q and 
hence the conventional over-use of health care, as shown in Figure 3. (The constraint that 
physicians act as the agent of their patients ensures that p ≤ λ < q as well.) At the extreme, when 
there are no restrictions interfering with physicians’ motives to do as much as possible, 
utilization is x' where s'(x) = 0, as shown in Figure 3.
  Even when the physician makes money by doing more than the optimal, she 
will still provide at most the optimal quantity of health care x* because of the binding constraint 
that doing more than x* will make the patient worse off.  The key assumption here is that the 
physician acts as an agent of the patient.  This assumption will not hold if patients ascribe greater 
benefits to procedures than is justified by clinical evidence or physician beliefs (Rotherberg, et 
al., 2010), or if the physician does not always account for patient preferences (Pritchard et al., 
1998). 
16
                                                 
15  The health savings account involves spending after-tax dollars, but these accounts also help to offset pre-existing 
tax distortions (such as the tax on labor supply), thus potentially moving the consumer’s choice closer to x*.  
  
16  To keep the figure simple, we have assumed constant social costs, but that is not necessary to make our point: 
marginal social costs can increase in the level of x (that is, q' (x)>0).  
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 More complicated is where net profitability π is positive, there are no capacity constraints, 
and physicians are able to convince patients that the treatments will benefit them, implying that 
s'(x) may turn negative.  Examples where physicians expose patients to serious mortality risk in 
return for financial gain are rare, but there is a larger potential margin for procedures where there 
is little evidence for improved survival but side effects are significant.  Examples include the 
decrement in sexual functioning following treatments for prostate cancer among older men, or 
chemotherapy administered to people with incurable cancers. The complex interaction between 
provider and patient is revisited in Section 4.2 below. 
 Finally, how might malpractice laws affect this equilibrium?  While much of the concern 
about malpractice laws have been directed towards “defensive medicine” that would tend to 
increase utilization, this model suggests more modest effects such as those found in Mello et al. 
(2010). Malpractice premiums increase fixed costs R, increasing work effort through the income 
effect, while the risk of malpractice should encourage more diagnostic tests.  But malpractice 
liability rules also reduce utilization through the substitution effect: the incremental procedure 
exposes the physicians to more malpractice risk and thus raises her implicit marginal cost per 
procedure (Currie and MacLeod, 2008; Baicker, Fisher, and Chandra, 2007).   
3.3 A Dynamic Model of Provider Behavior 
To this point, the analysis has been in a static framework.  We next turn to one that attempts to 
model the dynamics of change (see also McGuire, 2009). Our approach is to take the derivative 
of the first-order equation (8), 17
 (9) 
 rearrange and simplify.  Letting Δxjt = xjt+1 – xjt and similarly 
for other variables, we write: 
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Thus, the growth in health care real inputs is expressed as the sum of several components.  
Looking first at the numerator of (9), as income trends upward, one might expect a 
                                                 
17   Taking the total differential of the first-order condition yields the following expression:   
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corresponding increase in the value of a human life ΔΨt, as noted in the demand-side model 
above, and hence a more than proportional increase in the demand for health care innovations. 
On the other hand, premiums for health insurance Pt (from the budget constraint in Equation 2) 
would likely rise to maintain actuarial balance in the private insurance market; this in turn could 
dig into disposable income, cutting back on demand.  The second term on the RHS of (9) 
captures a shift in the survival curve – technological innovations that increase survival holding 
constant inputs; these imply movement along the survival production function to reestablish 
equilibrium conditions. For example, through either learning-by-doing or knowledge spillovers, 
the ability of providers to use a technology may improve over time. If so, more of that 
technology should be delivered to patients.  
 The primary control over U.S. health care expenditure growth is through the setting of prices, 
for example, through reimbursement rates for physician or inpatient services by Medicare and 
Medicaid (Newhouse, 2002), or through the negotiation of discounts by large managed care 
organizations and insurance firms. Thus the third term reflects the substitution effects arising 
from changes in the profitability of health care services – lower profitability reduces use of 
inputs.  But as the literature on physician behavior has emphasized, cutting reimbursement rates 
can have offsetting effects when physician or provider practices experienced reduced income, 
leading to the fourth term, at least for procedures or services that continue to be profitable.    
 The fifth term reflects changes in the shadow price of capacity or knowledge constraints.  
Capacity constraints are typically more explicit in countries such as the UK and Canada, where 
quantity restrictions based on central decisions of the government are the primary determinants 
of changes in both outcomes and costs.  But they may also be present in the U.S. in the short 
term through shortages in resources such as ICU hospital beds, specialists, or MRIs.  Changes in 
these resources are subject to a whole host of incentives, but changes take time, so gradual 
capacity adjustment could translate into short-term quantity constraints.  
 The final terms in (9) reflect the potential that individual patients are no longer better-off as a 
consequence of the additional health care services, and thus we assume that procedure growth 
would be curtailed or halted.  This would occur, for example, when the price facing consumers p, 
is rising, income is falling, or if the marginal value of the procedure is fading.   
 A critical parameter that affects the magnitude and speed of the growth in x is in the 
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denominator of Equation (9), the second derivative of the production function s″.  When there 
are well-defined groups of people who benefit from the treatment, and where outside of that 
group the treatment causes harm – such as anti-retroviral therapy for people with HIV/AIDS – 
the magnitude of s″ is large, meaning that any changes in prices, income, or other factors has a 
very small impact on its expansion.  By contrast, when there are a large number of people who 
could potentially benefit if only a small amount, then –s” is very small, which magnifies 
dramatically the potential changes over time in utilization.   
4. A Typology of the Productivity of Medical Technologies  
 The above analysis describes the static and dynamic nature of technology use for a given 
physician. But the aggregate productivity of health care spending depends critically on which 
technologies are used and which patients get them.  That is, consider Equation (9) but now 
extended to a variety of k different technological innovations or treatments.  Aggregate 
productivity for a given increase in spending will depend on the relative diffusion of each of 
these specific technological innovations and their respective value in improving outcomes. 
Summing the change in expenditures over all treatments yields  
ktktkt
k
kttttttt qxxqqxxqxq ∆+∆=∆+∆≅∆ ∑)( , 
where qt is the year-specific aggregate price index and  we have already summed over all j health 
care providers.  Ignoring the “revaluation” of existing lifespan because of change in the marginal 
value of life Ψt , the change in the economy-wide value of the quality-adjusted survival due to 
health care treatments (x) is approximated by:  
(10) 
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where Λskt(xkt) is the shift in the kth input production function, evaluated at xkt.18
 (11)   
  Combining (9) 
and (10), the net improvement in health outcomes relative to expenditures is:   
[ ] ktktktkt
k
ktktktktktttttt xqxsxqxxsxqs ∆−Ψ+∆−ΛΨ≅∆−∆Ψ −∑ )(')()( 1   
                                                 
18  That is, Λskt is the shift in the production function from t to t+1, holding factor inputs constant, or technological 
progress in the absence of technical or productive inefficiency (See Jacobs, Smith, and Street, 2006; also see Figure 
1 of Färe et al., 2004).  This equation ignores potential productivity spillovers, for example as was found in Chandra 
and Staiger (2007), or other interactive effects.   
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Thus, Equation (11) can be used to parse productivity gains as the sum of three components. The 
first term measures in part traditional technological innovation in health care as noted above; this 
may also include the development of complementary technologies that make existing 
technologies more productive.  But it will also reflect any secular change in relative technical 
inefficiency, for example if in the aggregate, hospitals or provider groups move closer to the 
production possibility frontier (Färe et al., 1994).  The second term represents changes in the real 
price q of inputs x.  Some view the level of q as the primary reason why health care costs so 
much in the United States (Anderson, et al., 2003).19
 The third term reflects the net productivity benefit of the kth treatment (the term in brackets, 
or the difference between the value of extra health less its costs) times the speed at which the kth 
treatment diffuses (Δxkt, as in Equation 9).  While this latter term affects our overall measure of 
productivity, it arises because of allocative inefficiency, in that the marginal rates of substitution 
for each input are not equal to their marginal rates of transformation (Garber and Skinner, 
2008).
 More relevant here is whether q is growing 
more rapidly in the U.S. than elsewhere.  While Gaynor and Vogt (2003) have shown that market 
consolidation can lead to cost increases, the magnitude of such effects are modest relative to 
aggregate trends.  Conversely, technological innovations producing the same inputs x but at 
lower cost q could lead to productivity gains (Weisbrod, 1991), a point to which we return in 
Section 6.4.  
20
 At this point, we can begin to see how the nature of preexisting distortions in health care 
might affect the aggregate productivity of health care expenditures.   First, consider a 
conventional competitive non-health sector of the economy where the marginal value of 
production always equals social cost.  In this case, the third term in (11) would drop out.  But in 
health care, there is both enormous heterogeneity in the cost-effectiveness of specific treatments, 
and heterogeneity in the speed at which inputs diffuse across treatment categories.  Regions or 
countries will experience attenuated productivity growth (conditional on total spending) when 
    
                                                 
19 Even at a point in time, the case of price differences is difficult to establish. Two nations may have the same 
number of hospitalization days or physician visits per capita. Because the intensity of these visits may be very 
different in terms of what was done and prescribed, these unmeasured differences in utilization will manifest 
themselves as price differences.   
20 This formulation sidesteps both the controversy surrounding how one accounts for future costs when a current 
innovation increases future survival probabilities, or future costs (e.g., Lee, 2008). 
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the fastest growing treatments are also those with poor net value.  This could occur both because 
the new technology has poor cost-effectiveness (Ψt skt ' - qkt < 0) or because the health care 
system fails to sort patients and deliver care to those who would benefit the most.  
 In considering medical technology, we therefore group technologies into three categories 
based on their average cost-effectiveness:  (I) Highly effective care including “home run” 
treatments with cost effectiveness ratios of as little as $50 per life-year (e.g. Cutler, 2004) and  
for whom the social productivity of expanding use is strongly positive (Ψsk' is much larger than 
qk); (II) Treatments where there are clear positive gains for a subset of people receiving 
treatment, but with considerable heterogeneity in the marginal effectiveness across the 
population; and (III) technology with poor cost-effectiveness for the overwhelming majority of 
patients or where we simply don’t know the value because of a lack of clinical studies.   
4.1 Category I: “Home Run” Technologies 
 The first category of medical technologies includes those that are cost-effective and useful 
for nearly everyone in the relevant population. Perhaps the most famous example of such an 
intervention is Joseph Lister’s recommendation that surgeons wash their hands, use gloves, and 
swab wounds with carbonic acid (Lister, 1867).21
 Cutler, Deaton, Lleras-Murray (2006) argue that new drugs, primarily antibiotics such as 
sulphonamide drugs, played an important role in reducing US mortality between the 1930s and 
1960. In particular, the development of these drugs allowed for progress against a range of 
bacterial killers including pneumonia, tuberculosis, dysentery and venereal disease. Similarly, 
the development of low-cost antibiotic “sulfa” drugs led to remarkable improvements in 
outcomes following outbreaks of bacterial meningitis. After the 1950s, there were incremental 
gains in meningitis mortality, but a large portion of the new developments, such as the third-
generation cephelosporins, were designed to treat infections that had developed resistance to the 
first- and second-generation antibiotics.   
 Improved health behaviors, arising for 
example from the publication of the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report on smoking, also fit into this 
category of innovation (Cutler and Kadiyala, 2003).   
                                                 
21 Lister acknowledged that his research was influenced by the Austrian physician, Ignaz Semmelweis. Semmelweis 
demonstrated that maternal mortality from puerperal fever (an infection of the genital tract after giving birth) could 
be reduced from 12.2 percent to 2.4 percent by making physicians wash their hands with chlorinated lime between 
autopsy and obstetrical rotations.  
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 Another example of highly cost-effective interventions comes from the introduction of 
surfactants to treat neonatal acute respiratory distress for newborns. In the last quarter of 1989 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use of two new formulations of this class 
of drugs. Schwartz et al. (1994) estimate that this drug reduced the odds of in-hospital mortality 
by 30 percent, and attribute to it 80 percent of mortality decline between 1989 and 1990. In 
addition to being a miracle drug for thousands of low birth-weight babies, surfactants also 
proved to be protective of cost, which declined by 10 percent for survivors, and 30 percent for 
decedents.   
 Often highly productive treatments diffuse slowly.  In some cases, policies that relax capacity 
or financial constraints, for example expanding coverage to highly productive neonatal care, can 
generate large productivity shifts (Currie and Gruber, 1997).  In other cases, overall productivity 
gains are enhanced when overtreatment is limited.  For example, consider the technologies 
characterized by initial large benefits for a segment of the population, but where –s″ is large in 
magnitude, as illustrated in Figure 4.   Even when the marginal productivity is pushed to s’(s) = 
0, as shown at x*, the average productivity of this innovation since its introduction  – that is, the 
area under the curve in Figure 4 (gross benefits) less the shaded rectangle (costs) is still 
substantial.  
 In other words, Category I treatments aren’t always low-cost. The best example is anti-
retroviral drugs for the treatment of HIV patients to prevent the development of full-blown 
AIDS, a treatment which, despite its high costs of both development and treatment, exhibits 
favorable cost-effectiveness ratios under $25,000 per life year (Duggan and Evans, 2005; 
Lichtenberg, 2006).  One study has found that the marginal dollar value to patients in terms of 
future life expectancy is roughly 20 times the costs of development (Philipson and Jena, 2006).  
Given the serious side-effects of the drug, however, no physician would ever prescribe it to 
anyone without HIV/AIDS.22
 Another example of a Category I success story is the treatment of testicular cancer.  Before 
1970, diagnosis was followed by near-certain early death.  Since that time, new developments in 
the treatment of testicular cancer have exhibited dramatic success, with remarkable cost-
effectiveness or even cost-saving (Shibley et al., 1990).  However, few men would agree to 
   
                                                 
22 The curve is not discontinuous however; treatment may start too early before CD4 counts fall off. 
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undergo an orchiectomy (don’t ask) without a confirmed diagnosis, limiting the growth in 
expenditures on testicular cancer.  And unfortunately, the AIDS and testicular cancer success 
stories are the exception rather than the norm, limiting their use as paradigms for health care 
productivity.  
4.2 Category II: Potentially Cost-Effective Technologies with Heterogeneous Benefits 
  A more interesting set of medical technologies are those which are cost-effective in some 
patients but have declining marginal benefits in others (so that –s″ is small).  Despite clear 
benefits to some patients, such technologies can still exhibit modest or even poor average cost-
effectiveness across all patients. 23  A leading example is angioplasty, more commonly known as 
PCI (percutaneous coronary intervention), an invasive procedure in which a cardiologist inserts a 
thin wire into the coronary arteries, and inflates a balloon at the tip of the wire to restore blood 
flow because of an arterial occlusion. Typically a wire mesh cylinder, known as a stent, is also 
inserted in the artery to prevent blockage from occurring again.  The price depends on who pays 
for it, but generally runs above $15,000. These have been shown to dramatically improve 
survival following a heart attack only if performed within the first 12 or 24 hours following its 
onset, and it is highly cost-effective for this use (Hartwell et al., 2005; Hochman et al., 2006).  
For stable coronary disease, roughly one-third of all PCI procedures, clinical trials have found no 
survival benefit and modest improved functioning relative to optimal medical therapy (Boden et 
al., 2007; Weintraub  et al., 2008). Its value, as measured by survival, is also higher for relatively 
younger patients, and is highly cost effective for this group, but it is of lesser value in older 
populations.24
 We therefore draw this innovation as having quite different characteristics from Category I 
advances.  Figure 5 shows a hypothetical graph of Category II benefits and costs using PCI as an 
example. While there are some who clearly benefit (i.e., primary PCI just after a heart attack), 
  Other examples include the continued diffusion of existing technologies such as 
Cesarean-sections, or new technologies, such as stent technology to repair malfunctioning aortic 
valves (Leon et al., 2010). 
                                                 
23  While heterogeneity in treatment effects is typically the norm, Category II treatments also include homogeneous 
treatments with uniform yet similarly uninspiring cost-effectiveness ratios of (say) $200,000 per life year.  
24  Chandra and Staiger (2007) note that the causal effect of intensive treatments for heart attacks improves one year 
survival by 18.5 percent in patients less than the age of 80, but increases one year survival by only 3.5 percent in 
those over the age of 80 (the latter result was not statistically different from zero). 
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there are many more people who gain small or near-zero benefits; on net as represented in Figure 
5, the average productivity of this innovation could in theory be zero or even negative.  
 Schwartz (1987) offers a related view of technological diffusion and cost growth. He notes 
that new technologies involve fewer risks, for example the use of laporoscopy rather than open 
surgery to remove inflamed gallbladders, and therefore they increase costs not because each 
procedure is more expensive, but because so many more patients may now experience relative 
gains.  As a consequence, per patient costs fall but total costs increase as the new procedure 
diffuses (Cutler and Huckman, 2003). 
 It is well known that across physicians, there are differences in the perception of benefits for 
specific procedures; furthermore they appear to predict overall spending across regions (Sirovich 
et al., 2009).  For example, stent (PCI) rates in Elyria, Ohio were three times the national U.S. 
average, and nearly six times the Canadian average (Abelson, 2006; Lucas et al., 2006; Alter et 
al., 2006).  The higher rates arose both from the strongly-held beliefs by Elyria cardiologists that 
a wider swath of elderly people could benefit from a stent, and that more stents (per person) 
should be inserted (Abelson, 2006).  These beliefs would be reinforced by lower complication 
rates among incremental patients with minimal arterial blockage.   
 This phenomenon can be illustrated as well in Figure 6, which shows how higher perceived 
(or actual) productivity, as shown by the dotted line, affects utilization.  When health care 
systems are constrained or –s” is large, differences in perceptions have little impact on 
utilization; Figure 6 shows optimal utilization, where the marginal productivity is equal to q, at 
M and M’; these differ by only a small amount. However, when there are few if any constraints, 
and –s” is small, very large utilization variations arise, as shown by the differences between X’ 
and Z.  As can be seen by the much larger cost “box” in Figure 6, these small differences in 
beliefs by providers can have very large effects on overall health care productivity. 
 Similarly, imaging technologies offer enormous incremental value for a subset of patients, 
but their efficacy in marginal patients is hard to establish.  Iglehart (2006) notes that physicians 
are now using computed tomography (CT), MRIs, and even positron-emission tomography 
(PET) for an ever-expanding list of diseases, leading to double-digit growth rates during some 
years (see Baker et al., 2003).  Despite this rapid growth, some suggest low marginal 
effectiveness (MedPAC, 2003; Miller, 2005).  In other words, there are specific uses of imaging 
 p. 24 
with unequivocal value, but at the margin the value approaches zero or even becomes harmful 
given the risk of false positives, incidental findings unrelated to the original inquiry 
(“incidentalomas”) or risks of radioactive exposure.25
 A final issue with Category II relates to differences in preferences across patients regarding 
the benefits and side-effects entailing loss of quality-of-life. This idea can also be captured by 
Figure 6; think of the dotted line as representing someone who is willing to risk the potential 
adverse outcomes associated with PCI (such as complications from surgery resulting in death) in 
return for functioning gains.  Alternatively, the individual may have a lower discount rate, and 
therefore value the benefits of increased survival at a higher rate.  Thus when –s” is small, 
modest differences in demand can also lead to large differences in utilization.     
 
 An example where preferences should matter is the treatment of prostate cancer for men.  
There is good evidence that, once clinically apparent, there are benefits of treatment through 
surgery or radiation therapy for men under age 65 (Bill-Axelson et al., 2008).  More 
controversial is the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test, which is predictive of prostate cancer 
years before it becomes clinically apparent but cannot distinguish between benign and virulent 
prostate cancers.  While a large U.S. randomized trial showed no mortality benefit from PSA 
screening, a recent Scandinavian study found PSA screening led to a large reduction in prostate 
cancer deaths, albeit with identical overall mortality rates. 26
4.3 Category III: Technologies with Modest or Uncertain Effectiveness 
 Unfortunately, the side effects 
associated with the treatments include the potential loss of sexual functioning and incontinence, 
as well as exposure to radiation.   Thus choices surrounding prostate cancer for men – like breast 
cancer screening for women under age 50 -- should depend not on "cookie cutter" guidelines, but 
on how patients trade off longevity with quality of life.  For these procedures, the key to 
productivity growth is ensuring that only well-informed people who want the procedure actually 
get it (Meltzer et al., 2005).    
                                                 
25  One study suggested 1.5 to 2 percent of all cancers in the U.S. were caused by CT radiation exposure (Brenner 
and Hill, 2007). 
26 Schroder et al. (2009) and Huggoson, et al. (2010); also see Andriole et al., 2009.  Preston and Ho (2009) show a 
marked drop in U.S. prostate cancer deaths beginning in the early 1990s.  The mystery is why mortality rates 
dropped so rapidly at that time; PSA testing, which first diffused in the late 1980s, yields no survival benefits for at 
least a decade (Huggoson et al., 2010).     
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 If Category I treatments are highly cost-effective, and Category II less so, this final category 
captures treatments where the average value of the procedure leads to poor (or non-existent) 
cost-effectiveness, or where there is considerable uncertainty about its benefits.  The classic 
example is a trial published in the New England Journal of Medicine on arthroscopic surgery for 
osteoarthritis of the knee, in which surgeons enter the knee and clean out particles from the joint 
(Moseley et al., 2002).  Over 650,000 such surgeries had been performed each year at a cost 
exceeding $5,000 per surgery. In the study, those in the control group received “placebo 
surgery”— skin incisions and simulated surgery.  The trial found no gain from arthroscopic 
surgery relative to sham surgery. 
 For ethical and logistical considerations, it is difficult to conduct double-blinded trials to 
establish the efficacy of every medical and surgical therapy. For many surgeries that target 
quality of life instead of well-defined clinical endpoints such as death or an acute hospitalization, 
measuring outcomes is more difficult and may be subject to patient biases, particularly where 
“sham” treatments would be unethical.  More generally, there is often considerable uncertainty 
about the benefits of a procedure for a specific patient – even if randomized trials show little 
average benefit, physicians may believe that because of heterogeneity in the population and the 
physician’s considerable skill and experience, their patients will benefit (Kolata, 2009). While 
this may be true in some cases, aggregate productivity depends on the average benefit, so 
continued use of such procedures with zero net benefit – given their positive cost – is guaranteed 
to reduce productivity.   
 Other Category III intensity measures include the frequency of office visits, ICU days for the 
chronically ill, and referrals to specialists (see Barnato et al., 2007).  Strictly speaking, these 
treatments do clearly benefit some patients – for example, Doyle (2010) suggested higher ICU 
days contributed to lower mortality for Florida tourists (but not Florida residents) admitted to 
emergency rooms.  On the other hand, patients treated aggressively in the hospital for advanced 
lung cancer experienced worse quality of life and shorter life expectancy relative to palliative 
care (Temel et al., 2010). More commonly, treatments are included in Category III because so 
much of their utilization is of unknown value.   
 One of the real challenges in evaluating new technology is that innovations whose benefits 
are not well understood could be viewed initially as Category III and thus not approved for use 
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(Schreyögg, Bäumler, and Busse, 2009).  It could take years for randomized (or observational) 
studies to establish them as Category II or even Category I treatments.  For example, the use of 
stents for recent heart attacks was once considered “off-label”, until randomized trials 
demonstrated effectiveness.  In contrast, arthroscopic surgery for knee osteoarthritis was a 
Category II technology before the Moseley et al. (2002) study moved it to Category III. 
   Recognizing the wide differences in cost-effectiveness ratios for specific Category I, II, and 
III treatments, ranging from just a few hundred dollars to millions per life-year, also helps to 
make sense of otherwise puzzling empirical patterns (Weinstein and Skinner, 2010).  Most 
studies of health care spending and outcomes find modest or even negative associations between 
spending and longer-term outcomes (Fisher et al., 2003a,b; Baicker and Chandra, 2004; Skinner 
et al., 2006; Silber et al., 2010; Barnato et al., 2010).  One way to think of these patterns as 
reflecting flat-of-the-curve (or nearly-flat) health care.  A different interpretation is that these 
weak associations reflect the near-independence of hospital-level investments in Category I 
treatments (that save lives) and Category III treatments (that cost money).   For example, 
hospitals quickest to adopt Category I treatments for heart attack patients such as aspirin and β 
blockers spent slightly less overall (Skinner and Staiger, 2009). However, within each hospital, 
spending more (conditional on their adoption of Category I treatments) still yielded better 
outcomes, but at a rapidly diminishing rate.  
 
5. Aggregate Growth in Expenditures and Health Outcomes   
 Armed with typology of treatments it is natural to ask: How much of these gains in survival, 
and how much in costs, during the past several decades have been driven by growth and 
diffusion of Category I, II, and III treatments? After all, during the past several decades, the 
average productivity of health care spending appears to be substantial.  Murphy and Topel 
(2006) find that the value of improved health through longevity has risen by 95 trillion dollars 
between 1970 and 2000, roughly three times medical spending during this period.   
 Ford et al. (2007) addressed this question by considering factors that explained the decline in 
cardiovascular mortality between 1980-2000, a decline of more than 300,000 deaths annually 
and the majority of survival gains during this period.  Their results are summarized in Table 2.  
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Sixty-one percent of the reduction in deaths was the consequence of risk factors such as 
smoking, drinking, and lower cholesterol and hypertension prevalence without medical 
intervention. Diabetes and obesity, on the other hand, were responsible for a 17% increase in 
mortality during the same period.  Thus nearly half of the overall gain in survival comes from 
behavioral factors rather than health care per se. 27
 Doing this same breakdown for costs is trickier.  The Category I (and even 1+) treatments 
were not likely to account for more than a small fraction of the enormous rise in U.S. health care 
costs.  For non-cardiac treatments, expenditures per HIV/AIDS patients are high, but the fraction 
of the population on anti-retrovirals is still small.  The role of Category II treatments in cost 
growth, such as stents and back surgery, is much larger (e.g., Groeneveld, et al., 2010), but the 
largest contribution to overall cost growth is likely to be Category III spending.  In part, this can 
be inferred from the stagnation in productivity growth over time.   Even when averaged across 
all three categories of treatments, the average cost of saving an additional life-year has risen 
three-fold since the 1970s, to as much as $246,000 per life-year (Cutler et al., 2006; Garber and 
Skinner, 2008).   
  Another 20 percent of the decline in mortality 
was the consequence of Category I treatments: cost-effective aspirin, beta blockers, and anti-
hypertensives.  Thirteen percent of the gains in survival occurred through higher cost 
pharmaceuticals: ACE inhibitors, anti-cholesterol statins and thrombolytics; these might be 
classified as Category I+ because their net benefit is substantial and marginal cost of production 
is modest, even if overuse poses risks (Wilson, 2010).  The Category II high-tech surgical 
interventions such as angioplasty, stents, and bypass surgery in turn accounted for an additional 7 
percent of the gain (Ford et al., 2007).  Of course, many of these treatments at the outset of the 
study period, 1980, would have been considered unproven and hence Category III, and only 
gradually were switched to Category I or II.  Similarly, there may be other treatments that are 
currently Category III but which could account for at least some of the residual 10 percent of the 
overall gains in mortality that aren’t otherwise explained by existing Category I and II 
treatments.    
                                                 
27  Thus Murphy and Topel (2006) attribute too much of the overall improvement in life expectancy to health care 
expenditures given that behavioral factors accounted for about half of the survival improvement.  But their 
conclusion that biomedical research exhibits extraordinarily high social returns still holds if medical research 
includes the landmark epidemiological studies (such as those linking tobacco to lung cancer) that provided the basis 
for behavioral changes.  
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 There is also evidence that less effective Category II and III treatments in the U.S. have 
diffused more widely than in other countries, potentially explaining the much higher growth in 
health care spending relative to GDP.  We consider four examples below.  First, cardiovascular 
procedures in the U.S. (587 per 100,000) lead those in Germany (357), and are far ahead of 
Denmark (207) and Switzerland (115) (Peterson and Burton, 2007).  The greater availability of 
primary PCI for heart-attack patients saves lives in the U.S., but its corresponding greater use for 
patients with little benefit (e.g., Tu, et al., 1997), attenuates overall productivity gains.   
 Second, the US is a leader in the diffusion of expensive new Category III technologies with 
unproven benefits.  One example is “robotic” surgery tools, which require an up-front investment 
of $1 million to $2.5 million per unit.  The leading manufacturer of such devices sold 1400 units 
in the United States during 2009, compared to just 400 in the rest of the world, with an annual 
price-tag for U.S. health care of up to $2.5 billion (Barbash and Glied, 2010). Similarly, proton-
beam therapy for prostate cancer require facilities costing up to $100 million and has 
experienced rapid growth in the U.S., but without a consensus on its benefits relative to 
conventional radiation therapy (Terasawa et al., 2009).   
 A third example comes from the use of intensive care unit (ICU) hospital beds.  In the U.K., 
the use of ICU beds is similar to that in the U.S. for conditions such as cardiac surgery that 
clearly indicate post-surgical ICU care. However, among elderly people over 85, 1.3% die in an 
ICU in the U.K., compared to 11.0% in the United States (Wunsch et al., 2009).  This by itself 
does not tell us whether the U.K. is using too few ICU days, or the U.S. too many.  But the rapid 
U.S. growth in ICU use since the 1990s, coupled with the likely cost-ineffectiveness of those 
incremental ICU days (Barnato et al., 2010), are consistent with poor productivity in U.S. health 
care spending.28
 Finally, the U.S. often experiences rapid diffusion of expensive pharmaceutical treatments 
with uncertain benefits.  Ezetimibe, a costly ingredient in the cholesterol-reducing drug Vytorin, 
was not recommended as a first-line treatment, nor has it subsequently been shown to be 
relatively effective at reducing cardiovascular disease.  In 2006 Ezetimibe accounted for 15 
percent of U.S. cholesterol-lowering drug sales, compared to just 3 percent in Canada 
  
                                                 
28  Average ICU days per Medicare enrollee in the last six months of life increased from 1.2 days in 1994 to 3.5 days 
in 2005 ( www.dartmouthatlas.org ).   It seems unlikely that ICU days for the over-65 population in the U.K. could 
have grown so rapidly, given the very low level of use in 2001.   
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(Jackevicius, et al., 2008).  Another example comes from the FDA approval of Avastin for 
recurrent glioblastoma (brain tumors) in the U.S. based on the results of an uncontrolled trial. 
Citing the same results, the European Medicines Agency reached the opposite decision.29
 Differences in spending growth between the U.S. and other countries cannot be explained 
simply by slower innovation in Europe: drug-eluting stents were approved for use in Italy a year 
before FDA approval in the U.S. (Schreyögg, Bäumler, and Busse, 2009).  And acknowledging 
that the U.S. is more likely to adopt Category II and III technologies doesn’t explain why it 
happens.   One potential explanation stems from Weisbrod’s (1991) 'induced innovation' 
hypothesis. The willingness of the U.S. insurance programs to reimburse for new innovations 
leads to dramatic growth in these categories of care.  It is less clear whether innovation occurs 
differentially because of market-size, insurance expansions, or factor prices (see Acemoglu and 
Linn, 2004; Acemoglu, Cutler, Finkelstein, and Linn, 2006; Acemoglu and Finkelstein, 2008).  
But we should still expect a far more rapid rate of innovation when there is an implicit promise 
that those innovations will be reimbursed, regardless of whether the innovation yields good value 
for the extra cost.
   
30
Another key explanation of differences in health care spending relative to GDP growth is 
the ability to finance health care spending, as shown originally by Getzen (1992).  Recall from 
Table 1 that all of the other high-spending countries in 1980 (except for the U.S.) experienced, 
on average, less than a one-percentage point increase in the share of GDP devoted to health care.  
Many of these high-spending countries began the 1980s with an already heavy tax burden (with 
roughly half of GDP devoted to taxation in Sweden and Denmark), limiting their ability to raise 
taxes further to support health care cost growth (Baicker and Skinner, 2011).  By contrast, the 
U.S. began the 1980s with an aggregate tax effort of about 30 percent, and funded much of the 
increase in health care costs through the less salient mechanism of rising insurance premiums 
reflected in sluggish take-home wage growth.  
 
 
                                                 
29 See the debate between American and European researchers in Wick, Weller, van den Bent and Stupp (2010) and 
Friedman et al. (2010).  
30 And in the longer-term, the newly developed product could become cost-effective once off-patent.  One could also 
argue that successful innovations developed in the U.S. benefits everyone in the world. But US norms for ineffective 
Category II or III treatments could also diffuse to other countries, saddling them with excess costs. 
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6.  Future Prospects for Controlling Health Care Costs 
 We return to our initial question regarding the twin trends in technology and cost growth in 
health care: How can countries ensure that a rising share of GDP devoted to health care is a good 
thing, and not a cause for concern?  We categorize potential reforms by considering each 
component from the model in Equation 9: capacity constraints (μ), demand-side changes (p, ψ), 
more cost-effectiveness analysis to understand the shape of s(x), and improving incentives faced 
by physicians and other health care providers (π, ω).  We consider approaches to improving 
health outcomes and reducing both the level and growth rate of inefficient spending. 31
6.1 Capacity Constraints 
  
 In the U.S., Medicare regulatory boards evaluating new technology are concerned solely with 
whether drugs or procedures provide positive benefits, but rarely reference costs.  Elsewhere, 
regulatory boards such England’s National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), 
use explicit cost factors in setting standards for the use of Category II or Category III treatments.   
In theory, these capacity constraints (μ) should ensure that any growth in costs should be limited 
to cost-effective treatments.  Typically these rulings are limited to specific and discrete choices, 
for example whether specific drugs can be used for a specific disease.  In practice, Category II 
treatments with heterogeneous benefits are more difficult to classify under “cover/not cover” 
decision rules.   
Medicare accounts for 20 percent of total spending, but what about the larger fraction of 
health care spending (32 percent) in private insurance markets?  Here the legal system – not so 
much malpractice per se, but the inability of private insurance companies to deny coverage for 
procedures with unproven (Category II or III) benefits – may be at fault for failing to control cost 
growth (Ferguson, Dubinsky and Kirsch, 1993).   These pressures are strengthened by the fact 
that Medicare does not reimburse with regard to economic value, making it very difficult for 
private insurers, especially a single private insurer, to use value in guiding their own coverage 
decisions.     
  As well, U.S. corporate laws make it very difficult for insurers and hospitals individually to 
                                                 
31  We assume here that rising costs are not a symptom of “Baumol’s cost disease”: sectors of the economy that rely 
heavily on human interactions fail to share in overall productivity gains.  Health care seems particularly well posed 
to enjoy large productivity gains, for example from the diffusion of information technology.  
p.31 
reduce the use of Category II and III technologies, even when physicians are employed by the 
hospital. These provisions prohibit any interference by insurers or hospitals with the medical 
judgment of physicians, on the grounds that only physicians hold medical licenses.  State laws 
also require insurers to pay for any medically necessary service as determined by a physician. 
Together, these incentives undercut the ability of an insurer to act as a residual claimant, so they 
‘reduce’ spending by negotiating prices with providers, rather than scaling back utilization. 
 Historically, the U.S. has not relied on quantity restrictions in health care planning, except for 
sometimes ineffective certificate of need programs (Conover and Sloan, 1998).  In theory, 
regional restrictions to discourage duplication and overbuilding of surgical units, MRIs, and 
hospital or ICU beds could control unrestricted growth in Category II or III procedures.   But this 
approach to market-level quantity restrictions would require a tectonic shift in the U.S. 
regulatory and policy environment.     
6.2 Demand-side incentives 
 Economists are naturally drawn to the idea of raising the price (p) faced by consumers to 
ensure that patients truly value the treatments they receive.  Consequently, there is widespread 
support for limiting the income-tax exclusion for employer-sponsored health insurance, thereby 
raising the out-of-pocket costs of health insurance (Gruber, 2009). Health savings accounts 
(HSA), tax-preferred savings designed to be accumulated over time for health care bills, are 
another approach to reducing moral hazard.  These are typically coupled with a catastrophic 
insurance cap on health care spending that may depend in turn on household income.  Once 
above the cap, however, moral hazard still intrudes; even with a $5,000 deductible, the patient 
has no cost incentive to choose procedure A costing $10,000 over procedure B costing $20,000.   
For this reason, one recent proponent of demand-side incentives suggested a catastrophic cap of 
$50,000 – thus effectively dismantling the risk-sharing component of health insurance for low 
and middle-income households (Goldhill, 2009).    
 In the conventional approach to improving cost-sharing, the copayment is either uniform 
across different types of treatment (ranging from highly effective to ineffective), or is set 
depending on the elasticity of demand for the service.    For well-informed patients who are 
cognizant of marginal costs and benefits, this is sufficient (Pauly and Blavin, 2008). But patients 
may not always make appropriate decisions about the use of services when faced with higher 
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copayments and coinsurance.32
 How will a demand-side approach affect the adoption or diffusion of new technology?  If the 
expansion of health insurance coverage under Medicare in 1966 led to rapid technological 
diffusion (Finkelstein, 2007), then why shouldn’t cost-sharing reverse the tide?  There is at least 
anecdotal evidence that high-income patients would just say no to cost-ineffective treatments if 
asked to pay out-of-pocket, suggesting that cost-sharing would discourage the most expensive 
new and marginally effective technologies.
  A different approach is to use “value-based” insurance plans that 
have higher prices for Category III and some Category II payments, but lower prices for 
Category I treatments.  Prices (or more generally, the size of patient-cost sharing) could be based 
on the results of clinical trials. While this approach has been applied to lowering prices of 
Category I treatments with some success (e.g. Chernew et al., 2008), insurance plans that assess 
significant copayments for Category II or III treatments are rare, perhaps because of the 
difficulty in determining the medical necessity of specific hospital or ICU admission, or the 
idiosyncratic benefit that a patient may attach to these services.  
33
6.3 Comparative-Effectiveness Analysis 
  But even with demand-side incentives for a larger 
fraction of the population, government agencies must decide whether (or how much) Medicaid 
and Medicare will cover for new treatments, or how to adopt coverage and cost-effectiveness 
rules as Ψ, the implicit value of additional health benefits, evolves over time.   
To the extent that inefficiency is partially caused by providers not knowing the shape of s(x), 
more trials or well-designed observational studies could improve the productivity of health care 
spending (Chandra, Jena, and Skinner, 2011).  But many Category II and III interventions require 
estimating treatment effects across a wide variety of phenotypes and genotypes, requiring much 
larger study sample sizes and lengthier study periods than typically available.  Complicating 
decisions further, the benefits of an intervention vary not only by type of patient but also by type 
of provider who delivers the treatment (Wennberg et al., 1998; Chandra and Staiger, 2007).  
None of these concerns lessen the value of what can be learnt from trials and observational 
                                                 
32 Although most evidence suggests that health is not adversely affected by greater patient cost-sharing on average; 
see Newhouse (1993) and Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010). 
33 One former corporate finance officer whose insurance covered the $93,000 prostate cancer drug Provenge was 
explicit about his willingness-to-pay: “’I would not spend that money,’ because the benefit doesn't seem worth it.” 
(Marchione, 2010).  Others have pointed out the difficulty of judging “true” demand for health care, particularly 
among those near the end of life (Becker, Murphy, and Philipson, 2007).   
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studies, but it does suggest that a serious attempt to embrace comparative effectiveness research 
would require many trials and a large budget – albeit a budget justified by the considerable 
world-wide benefits of improved physician and patient decision-making.   
6.4 Changing health care provider incentives  
 Growth rates may vary because of the evolution of ω, or the marginal importance of financial 
factors for health care providers.  Certainly the rapid real growth rate in spending observed in 
McAllen TX, 8.3 percent during 1992-2006, in contrast to El Paso TX which grew at just 3.4 
percent, is consistent with the evidence of a growth in McAllen’s “entrepreneurial” activities 
during the period of analysis.34
 More generally, a change in payment incentives away from traditional fee-for-service care 
could also affect growth in both outcomes and costs.  For example, if the incentive model were 
expanded to include more profitable reimbursements π for improved health outcomes, one could 
observe both better outcomes and lower costs.  However, current incentives provide little scope 
for this type of innovation (Cutler, 2010).  In one case, a back pain clinic began to steer patients 
to low-cost rehabilitation, rather than sending them to the hospital immediately for diagnostic 
tests and back-surgery.  Despite improved outcomes and lower costs, the hospital was forced to 
petition the insurance company to reimburse it for some of the lost profits on MRIs not 
performed (Fuhrmans, 2007).   
 Another cause for ω to evolve is the time-varying intensity of 
market competition affecting both income and prices.  For example, Rau (2010) has documented 
a very rapid growth in diagnostic and surgical facilities in Provo, Utah during the 2000s as 
multiple health care providers sought to expand market share.  
 The current system in the U.S. is not particularly supportive of competition among insurance 
carriers or providers.  Medicare is explicitly prohibited from selectively contracting with more 
efficient physicians. In contrast, hospitalizations are reimbursed by bundled payments measured 
as DRGs (diagnosis-related groups), thus limiting the incentives to over-provide hospital care. In 
the Medicare program, there has been very little per capita real growth since 1992 in these types 
of DRG-related categories, more likely to encompass Category II treatments.  By contrast, 
                                                 
34 As Gawande (2009, p. 38) characterized the change in ω:  “The surgeon came to McAllen in the mid-nineties, and 
since then, he said, ‘the way to practice medicine has changed completely. Before, it was about how to do a good 
job. Now it is about “How much will you benefit?”’” 
 p. 34 
growth in home-health care, outpatient visits, office visits and diagnostic testing—all Category 
III areas of care where reimbursements are based on volume and the “right rate” is not known – 
have exhibited very rapid growth (Chandra et al., 2010). And at least for home health care, the 
additional spending appeared to have no impact on health outcomes (McKnight, 2006).  
 Rewarding cost-savings would be a natural place to increase the productivity of health care 
spending.   This dilemma also confronted Weisbrod (1991), who optimistically described the 
prospective payment system (PPS) then recently introduced by Medicare: 
With a hospital’s revenue being exogenous for a given patient once admitted, and 
an HMO’s revenue being exogenous for a member for the given year, the 
organization’s financial health depends on its ability to control costs of treatment.  
Thus, under a prospective payment finance mechanism, the health care delivery 
system sends a vastly different signal to R & D sector, with priorities the reverse 
of those under retrospective payment.  The new signal is as follows: Develop new 
technologies that reduce costs, provided that quality does not suffer “too much.” 
(p. 537, italics in original text.) 
 Weisbrod was perhaps too sanguine about PPS; in retrospect it has not fundamentally 
changed the incentives to innovate, as it created DRGs for new procedures (McClellan, 1996), 
created incentives to “unbundle” post-acute care, and exempted certain capital costs from the 
expenditure cap, thereby failing to discourage capital spending (Newhouse, 2002; Acemoglu and 
Finkelstein, 2006).  Currently, less than 0.5% of new innovations would qualify as Weisbrod’s 
cost-saving technologies (Nelson et al., 2009).    
 But the fundamental message in Weisbrod is still correct – only when health care is 
reimbursed on the basis of its fundamental value will innovations be directed at highly cost-
effective treatments.  The greatest saving could arise not so much from new cost-saving devices, 
but instead from reducing the organizational fragmentation inherent in U.S. health care (Cebul et 
al., 2008).  The more than two-fold differences in risk- and price-adjusted costs across top-
ranked U.S. academic medical centers treating heart attack patients (Fisher et al., 2004) are not 
due to “what” is provided, since nearly all academic medical centers have access to the latest 
technology.  Instead, differences are related to “how” it is provided or the organization of the 
health care treatment – the frequency of follow-up visits, referrals to subspecialists, hospital 
days, and the intensity of diagnostic testing and imaging procedures.   
 To confront problems of fragmented care, some have embraced the idea of an integrated 
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delivery system.  Because such systems retain the savings from better prevention, lower 
readmission rates, and greater compliance with medications, they have better incentives to avoid 
therapies of dubious benefit.  The 2010 U.S. health care reforms focused on “accountable care 
organizations” (ACOs); examples include the traditional integrated systems such as 
Intermountain in Utah or the Geisenger Clinic in Pennsylvania, but can also encompass 
traditional hospital-physician networks (Fisher et al., 2009).  Such a construct could come closer 
to the ideal expressed by Weisbrod by providing incentives for cost-saving innovations.   
However, we do not know how well ACOs could sidestep cost-ineffective technologies, 
particularly if the latest shiny innovation enhanced market share (Chernew, et al., 2010). 
    
7.  Conclusion 
 There are no easy solutions to the problem of rising costs in health care, as has become 
evident in the political debate over the 2010 U.S. health care reform bill.  Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 
then-director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) put it best:  “Social-Security is Grenada.  
Medicare is Vietnam.” (Wolf, 2005)  Still, our lengthy survey of the economics and medical 
literature suggests several observations.  
 First, attributing cost growth and improvements in outcomes to “technology growth” is too 
simplistic and tells us little about where the cost growth is occurring, whether such growth 
should be tamed, and if so, how it should be done. Some countries and some regions in the U.S. 
have managed to avoid the very rapid growth in expenditures that is now threatening the 
financial health of many federal and state budgets around the world. The key point is that U.S. 
growth in health care costs is neither inevitable nor necessarily beneficial for overall productivity 
gains. Instead, cost growth is the aggregated outcome of a large number of fragmented decisions 
regarding the use and spread of both old and new health technologies.  
 Second, there is wide heterogeneity in the productivity of medical treatments, ranging from 
very high (aspirin for heart attacks and surfactants for premature births) to low (stents for stable 
angina), or simply zero (arthroscopy for osteoarthritis of the knee).  This fact motivated our 
distinguishing among three different types of treatments, arrayed by their contributions to 
productivity gains.  The Category I set of effective treatments appears to be the largest 
contributor to survival and functioning gains, while the Category III set of low-productivity 
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group or with uncertain benefits, is most strongly associated with health care cost growth.  It is 
perhaps tautological, but still worth noting that countries or systems of care that encourage the 
first group of innovations but discourage the third group are most likely to exhibit high aggregate 
productivity growth and a slower overall growth rate relative to GDP. 
 Finally, the most difficult questions relate to health care policy going forward, where there 
does not appear to be a single magic bullet to “solve” the health care problem.  The U.S. and 
most other countries are struggling with rising costs and a diminished ability to raise taxes or 
health insurance premiums.  As well, the U.S. leads the world with the extent of waste in their 
health care system (McKinsey Global Institute, 2008).  The extent of waste in the U.S. could, 
ironically, prove to be a boon if a fundamental restructuring of health care unleashed some of 
this lost productivity; gradually eradicating 30 percent of waste would depress cost growth rates 
by 1.3 percentage points over the next two decades.  The alternative to not making such changes 
is far more worrisome:  Rising political and economic resistance against tax and insurance 
premium hikes could serve as a particularly inefficient brake on both health care costs and health 
care innovation.    
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Table 1: Health Care Share of GDP for OECD Countries, 1980 and 2008 
 
 
 Healthcare Share of GDP 
Annual Growth Rate 
(1980-2008) 
 
Country 1980 2008 Increase  
Healthcare 
Spending 
 GDP Per 
Capita 
      Countries with Low 1980 Health Spending (as a % of GDP) 
 Spain 5.3 9.0 3.7 4.5% 2.5% 
 Portugal 5.3 9.9* 4.6 4.4% 2.4% 
 UK 5.6 8.7 3.1 3.8% 2.2% 
 Greece 5.9 9.7 3.8 3.1% 1.5% 
 New Zealand 5.9 9.8 3.9 3.0% 1.1% 
 Australia 6.1 8.5 2.4 2.9% 1.8% 
 Belgium 6.3 10.2 3.9 3.3% 1.4% 
 Finland 6.3 8.4 2.1 3.0% 1.9% 
 Iceland 6.3 9.1 2.8 2.4% 1.0% 
 Japan 6.5 8.1 1.6 2.5% 1.8% 
 Countries with Medium 1980 Health Spending (as a % of GDP) 
 Canada 7.0 10.4 3.4 2.9% 1.5% 
 France 7.0 11.2 4.2 3.1% 1.4% 
 Norway 7.0 8.5 1.5 4.3% 3.5% 
 Switzerland 7.3 10.7 3.4 2.4% 1.0% 
 Austria 7.4 10.5 3.1 2.8% 1.6% 
 Netherlands 7.4 9.9 2.5 3.1% 2.1% 
  Countries with High 1980 Health Spending (as a % of GDP) 
 Ireland 8.2 8.7 0.5 4.2% 3.8% 
 Germany 8.4 10.5 2.1 1.8% 1.6% 
 Denmark 8.9 9.7 0.8 1.9% 1.7% 
 Sweden 8.9 9.4 0.5 1.6% 1.4% 
 United States 9.0 16.0 7.0  4.0% 1.8% 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2010.  Data for either 2007 or 2008, except for * (2006). The 1980 German data 
refers to West Germany only.  Adding the growth in health care spending relative to GDP for 
1980-1990 and for 1992-2008, yields an increase of only 0.8 percentage points. 
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Table 2: Accounting for Improved Cardiovascular Health 1980-2000 
-
Source: Ford et al. (2007) and authors’ calculations 
Expensive (thousands of 
dollars)
Moderate (dollars)
Low (pennies)
Very low
Very low
Medical Cost
70,762  (20%)Aspirin, beta blockers, 
anti- hypertensives
25,630    (7%)Angioplasty / stents / 
bypass
44,870  (13%)Statins , ACE inhibitors, 
thrombolytics
- 59,370  ( - 17%)Bad Behavior (Rise in 
obesity, diabetes)
209,000   (61%)Good Behavior (Drop in 
smoking, blood pressure, 
cholesterol, inactivity)
Number of Deaths 
Avoided/Postponed
Intervention
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Figure 1. Percent of GDP spent on healthcare. Data for Germany refer to West Germany. 
Source: OECD. 
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Figure 2: Variations in Medicare Expenditure Growth, Selected Hospital Referral Regions 
1992-2006. Source: Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare (www.dartmouthatlas.org).  Estimates are 
age, sex, and race adjusted, drawn from the 5% Continuous Medicare History Survey, and 
adjusted by the GDP implicit price deflator, with all prices in 2006 dollars.  
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Figure 3: Quantity of health care spending given constraints facing health care providers 
and the marginal productivity of health care spending.  Note: In the figure above curve 
Ψs’(x) is the value of life multiplied by the marginal productivity of healthcare spending. In a 
hypothetical country ‘UK’ supply constraints are sufficiently stringent that their combined 
impact is greater than the optimal social cost q; this country delivers less than the optimal 
amount x*.  The optimum is at X*, while a country spending beyond the optimum is where λ, the 
combined set of quantity restrictions on utilization for the provider, is less than q.  Note that λ is 
at least as large as p, the price facing the consumer; this ensures that the patient’s benefits are at 
least as large as her out-of-pocket payments p for the procedure.   
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Figure 4: Benefits (area under the curve) and Costs of Category I Innovation Note: The 
vertical axis is scaled to reflect a constant value per quality-adjusted live year (e.g., $100,000 per 
life year). 
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Figure 5: Benefits (area under the curve) and Costs of Category II Innovation  Note: The 
vertical axis is scaled to reflect a constant value per quality-adjusted live year (e.g., $100,000 per 
life year). 
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 Figure 6: Differences in Utilization arising from Variation in Physician Beliefs or in 
Demand.  The dotted line represents a higher perceived benefit schedule from the procedure, 
whether because of physician belief or patient demand.  Differences in utilization widen where 
the –s” is small (i.e., between X’ and Z) compared to steeper sections of the marginal 
productivity curve (M versus M’).  The vertical axis is scaled to reflect a constant value per 
quality-adjusted live year (e.g., $100,000 per life year). 
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Figure 7: Hypothetical Spending and Outcomes for Hospitals with Different Production 
Functions Notes: Shaded dots cluster around production function F2, while open dots are drawn 
around production function F1.  
 
